Decision Number 1072-BR-90 - Voluntary Quit - Section 8-1001 - Maryland Unemployment Decisions Digest - Appeals
BOARD OF APPEALS
|DECISION NO: 1072-BR-90
DATE: October 26, 1990
|CLAIMANT: Clifford Kroski||APPEAL NO.: 9010321|
|EMPLOYER: Social & Scientific Systems||L.O. NO: 40|
Issue: Whether the claimant left work voluntarily, without good cause, within the meaning of Section 6(a) of the law; whether the claimant was discharged for gross misconduct or misconduct, connected with the work, within the meaning of Section 6(b) or 6(c) of the law.
- NOTICE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT -
YOU MAY FILE AN APPEAL FROM THIS DECISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAWS OF MARYLAND. THE APPEAL MAY BE TAKEN IN PERSON OR THROUGH AN ATTORNEY IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BALTIMORE CITY. IF YOU RESIDE IN BALTIMORE CITY, OR THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE COUNTY IN MARYLAND IN WHICH YOU RESIDE.
THE PERIOD FOR FILING AN APPEAL EXPIRES AT MIDNIGHT ON November 25, 1990.
|For the Claimant:||For the Employer:|
REVIEW OF THE RECORD
Upon review of the record in this case, the Board of Appeals reverses the decision of the Hearing Examiner. The Board makes the following findings of fact based on all of the testimony.
The claimant first worked on September 7, 1989. He was employed as a person who answers a hotline. The exact nature of this hotline is not disclosed in the record. The claimant earned $24,200 per year.
In May of 1989, the claimant informed the employer that he had been promised a new job with the City of Baltimore. The claimant told this to the employer so the employer would have adequate time to seek a replacement, as the claimant's job required someone to be there at all times.
The supervisor informed the claimant that he needed a date on which the claimant was leaving so that a replacement could be recruited. The claimant told the supervisor that there was no definite date set for the beginning of his employment with the City of Baltimore, but that he would be doing it at sometime in the future. The claimant's informing of the employer of his new job was not a resignation in itself; the claimant did not intend to resign at that time.
The supervisor, however, pressed the claimant and demanded that he submit a resignation date within 24 hours. The claimant contacted the City of Baltimore and was still unable to get a definite date. Under pressure to come up with a date, however, the claimant consulted with the City of Baltimore and himself came up with the date of July 13, 1990.
Shortly before July 13, however, the claimant was informed by the City of Baltimore that his job was not going to begin in July, but that it would be delayed for at least several more weeks. The claimant then attempted to retain his full-time employment, but his supervisor informed him that the only thing that he could do was apply for part-time, on-call positions. The claimant applied for this type of job because the supervisor led him to believe that this was the only type available. After July 13, 1990, the claimant was no longer employed at his full-time job for this employer. He did work the hours which were available on-call, which amounted to less than six hours per week.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Board concludes that the claimant was discharged. By informing the employer in May that he had accepted another job which was to begin at some indefinite time in the future, the claimant did not resign, nor did he show the intention to resign. He specifically informed his employer that there was no definite date set for his job change. This action shows an intent, not to quit the employment, but to keep the employment.
The employer's subsequent action in requiring the claimant to come up with a date for his resignation within 24 hours amounted to a discharge. The claimant was placed in a position of having to disavow his intention of eventually going to a different job or arbitrarily picking a date for his resignation. The claimant's intention of eventually changing jobs was within his rights and was not a resignation in itself. Giving the claimant a choice between giving up that right or resigning on a specific date amounts to a forced resignation. The Board has always ruled that a forced resignation should be considered, for unemployment insurance purposes as a discharge within the meaning of Section 6(b) or (c) of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law, not as a voluntary quit under Section 6(a) of the law.
When a claimant has been discharged, the relevant question is whether he was discharged for misconduct or gross misconduct under Section 6(b) and (c) of the law. The burden is on the employer to show that the claimant committed such misconduct. In this case, there is no allegation of misconduct on the employer's part. The Board has repeatedly ruled in the past that the announcement of an intention to leave the employer at some time in the future does not amount to misconduct. The claimant will therefore be found to have been discharged, but not for any misconduct.
The claimant was discharged, but not for any misconduct within the meaning of Section 6(b) or (c) of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law. He did not voluntarily quit his employment within the meaning of Section 6(a) of the law. No disqualification is imposed based upon his reason for leaving Social & Scientific Systems.
The claimant may contact his local office regarding the other eligibility requirements of the law.
The decision of the Hearing Examiner is reversed.
Thomas W. Keech, Chairman
Donna P. Watts, Associate Member
COPIES MAILED TO:
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE - EASTPOINT
LOWER APPEALS DECISION
|Date Mailed: 9/6/90|
|CLAIMANT: Clifford J. Kroski||APPEAL NO.: 9010321|
|EMPLOYER: Baltimore City Police Dept.
c/o Dept. of Personnel
|L.O. NO: 40|
Issue: Whether the unemployment of the claimant was due to leaving work voluntarily, without good cause, within the meaning of Section 6(a) of the Law.
-NOTICE OF RIGHT TO PETITION FOR REVIEW-
ANY INTERESTED PARTY TO THIS DECISION MAY REQUEST A REVIEW AND SUCH PETITION FOR REVIEW MAY BE FILED IN ANY OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT, OR WITH THE APPEALS DIVISION, ROOM 515, 1100 NORTH EUTAW STREET, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201, EITHER IN PERSON OR BY MAIL.
THE PERIOD FOR FILING A PETITION FOR REVIEW EXPIRES AT MIDNIGHT ON 9/21/90.
|For the Claimant:
|For the Employer:
Herbert Miller, President
FINDINGS OF FACT
The claimant filed an original claim for unemployment insurance benefits at Eastpoint, effective July 15, 1990.
The claimant had been employed by Social and Scientific Systems, Inc. as an Information Specialist at a pay rate of $24,200 annually. The claimant had been employed with this firm from September 7, 1989, to July 13, 1990.
In early May 1990, the claimant mentioned to his supervisor that there was a possibility that he would be offered a position with the City of Baltimore as an EAP Counselor, that he had been selected for the position, but that the employer could not give him a starting date. The supervisor informed the claimant that he would need a starting date so that he could recruit a replacement. The claimant contacted the City representative who had interviewed him, who indicated that the probability of a starting date would be approximately July 13, 1990. The claimant reported to the supervisor that it was uncertain but it appeared to be approximately July 13, 1990. The supervisor then pressed the claimant for a definite starting date. Thereupon, the claimant tendered a written notice of resignation stating that he would terminate his employment with Social and Scientific Systems, Inc. on Friday, July 13, 1990, at the close of business on that day. The claimant provided this written notice of resignation after the supervisor had pressed him to provide that information within 24 hours.
On or about July 15, 1990, the claimant learned from the City of Baltimore that the starting date would be delayed due to certain political considerations. At this time, the anticipated starting date was sometime in September.
Before the claimant learned from the City that the starting date would not be July 13, 1990, he had requested of the supervisor in writing that he be assigned to a part-time, on-call position, which was granted. The claimant did not attempt to regain his full-time status after learning that the City job was being delayed for an indefinite period of time. The claimant did not consult with the Human Resources Department, nor did he contact Mr. Miller directly concerning the delay. The employer could have, and was in the position of granting the claimant an extension of his employment until such time as the new job would start. The claimant assumed that he had no chance of regaining his full-time status.
The claimant did not consider deferring his Notice of Resignation until after he received confirmation of the City of Baltimore concerning the new anticipated position.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The claimant voluntarily tendered a letter of Notice of Resignation informing the employer that he intended to terminate the employment for a cause which was not directly attributable to, arising from or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer. Therefore, based upon this definition in the Unemployment Insurance Law, the claimant voluntarily left employment without "good cause" within the meaning of the Law. Although understandably, the supervisor was pressing the claimant for a definite answer as to when he would be leaving the job and starting the new job, yet no one was compelling or coercing the claimant to provide a Notice of Resignation in writing at any time. The claimant elected to tender that resignation upon the assumption that he would be starting a new job in mid-July. However, this did not come to pass, and the claimant took no other steps to preserve his full-time employment. Therefore, I must conclude that the claimant not only quit his job without good cause, within the meaning of the Law, but that he had failed to show any " valid circumstances" which must be a substantial cause directly attributable to, arising from or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer, or another cause of such a necessitous or compelling nature that the individual has no reasonable alternative but to leave the job. Accordingly, I conclude that the claimant left his employment, without good cause, within the meaning of the Law, and benefits must be denied.
The unemployment of the claimant was due to leaving work voluntarily, without good cause, within the meaning of Section 6(a) of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law. Benefits are denied for the week beginning July 8, 1990 and until the claimant becomes re-employed, earns at least ten times his weekly benefit amount ($2,150) and thereafter becomes unemployed through no fault of his own.
The determination of the Claims Examiner is affirmed.
Robin L. Brodinsky, Hearing Examiner
Date of hearing: 8/21/90
rc/Cassette No: 6153
(40309) - Specialist ID:
Copies mailed on 9/6/90 to:
Unemployment Insurance - Eastpoint - MABS