BOARD OF APPEALS - REMAND FROM CIRCUIT COURT
|DECISION NO: 1085-BH-83
DATE: September 21, 1983
|CLAIMANT: Vincent DePaul Gisriel, Jr.
|| APPEAL NO.: 23468
|EMPLOYER: Charles H. Steffey, Inc.
||L.O. NO: 15
||APPELLANT: Remand from Circuit Court Claimant Appeal
Issue: Whether the claimant's unemployment was due to leaving
work voluntarily, without good cause, within the meaning of §6(a) of the Law.
- NOTICE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT -
YOU MAY FILE AN APPEAL FROM THIS DECISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE LAWS OF MARYLAND. THE APPEAL MAY BE TAKEN IN PERSON
OR THROUGH AN ATTORNEY IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BALTIMORE
CITY, OR THE CIRCUIT OF THE COUNTY IN MARYLAND IN WHICH YOU RESIDE.
THE PERIOD FOR FILING AN APPEAL EXPIRES AT MIDNIGHT October 21, 1983.
|For the Claimant:
Vincent DePaul Gisriel, Jr. - Claimant
| For the Employer:
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE
was remanded from the Circuit Court to allow the claimant
to present additional testimony and argument in support
of his position. At the hearing, the claimant elected
to proceed by presenting additional argument only. The
Board has reviewed the entire record in this case.
FINDINGS OF FACT
was employed on November 5, 1979 until September 15, 1981
as a property manager at a pay rate of $290.00 per week.
a difficult job. The job required dealing with the Boards
of Directors of numerous condominiums, dealing with a
shifting population of contractors, travel within the
central Maryland area, dealing with the financial records
of the Boards under his care and being responsible in
an overall way for the smooth running of several projects
at the same time.
was warned by the employer, and was fully aware, prior
to ever having accepted the job, that the job was a hectic
and demanding one. The primary reason that the claimant
left his employment was that he decided, after almost
two years of this employment, that he was unwilling to
cope with the hectic nature of this type of employment
any longer and would seek employment in another field.
The job was, in some respects, slightly more difficult
than the claimant had expected, but it was not so different
from the job described in his employment interview that
he could reasonably complain.
the claimant left was that there had been an embezzlement
concerning one of the projects with which he was associated,
and he was not satisfied with the speed of the investigation
which the employer was conducting. This was not, by any
means, the primary reason for the claimant leaving his employment.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The claimant primarily left his employment because, although
he was aware when he took the job of the hectic nature
of the employment, he decided after approximately two
years that he was no longer willing to undergo the problems
associated with this type of work and would enter another
field of endeavor. This reason is not good cause within
the meaning of §6(a) of the Maryland Unemployment Insurance
Law. It is important to note that the claimant was fully
aware of the nature of the job prior to having taken it.
In these circumstances, a simple desire to go into another
line of work does not amount to good cause within the
meaning of §6(a) of the Law, nor does it amount to serious,
valid circumstances sufficient to mitigate the penalty
to be imposed under §6(a) of the law.
If the claimant had proven both that his primary reason for
leaving was the handling of the embezzlement investigation
and that he had reason to believe that serious illegal
or unethical acts were being committed of which he was
necessarily made a part, the claimant would have had good
cause within the meaning of §6(a). In this case, however,
the claimant proved neither that this was his primary
reason for leaving nor that a serious legal or ethical
question was raised by the employer's practices.
The claimant left his work voluntarily, without good cause,
within the meaning of §6(a) of the Maryland Unemployment
Insurance Law. He is disqualified from receiving benefits
from the week beginning September 13, 1981 and until he
becomes reemployed, earns at least ten times his weekly
benefit amount ($1,400.00) and thereafter becomes unemployed
through no fault of his own.
The previous decision of the Board, Decision No. 1021-BR-82, is affirmed.
Thomas W. Keech, Chairman
Hazel A. Warnick, Associate Member
DATE OF HEARING: July 26, 1983
COPIES MAILED TO:
Jonathan Azriel, Esquire
Charles H. Steffey, Inc.
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE - WESTMINSTER